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RECENT DECISIONS
RIGHT OF PRIVACY: KNOWING OR RECKLESS FALSITY IN PUBLICATION RE-
QUIRED TO SUSTAIN LIABILITY UNDER NEW YORK RIGHT OF PRIVACY STATUTE.
In 1952, James Hill, his wife and five children were seized as hostages by
three escaped convicts and held for nineteen hours. The next spring,
James Hayes' novel, "The Desperate Hours," was published, describing a
similar experience. The book was made into a play, and in 1955 an article
in Life magazine characterized the play as "inspired by the family's ex-
perience." Actors from the play were photographed in the house the
Hills had been living in at the time. One picture accompanying the text
in Life showed the son being "roughed up ;" Another showed the daugh-
ter biting the hand of one of the convicts; a third showed the father
throwing his gun through the door after a "brave try" to save his family
had been foiled. After their release in the actual incident, Hill had told
newsmen that the family had been treated courteously and that there
had been no violence. He sued for and was granted damages under the
New York right of privacy statutes.1 Held, the trial court erred in fail-
ing to instruct the jury that liability could be predicated only upon a
showing that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. Time, Inc., v. Hill, 87 S. Ct.
534 (1967).
The right of privacy, "the right to be let alone,"' 2 it is said, did not
exist at common law.3 The genesis of the right is commonly traced to an
article by Warren and Brandeis published in the Harvard Law Review
in 1890.4 Dean Prosser attributes the impetus for the article to the cov-
erage given Mrs. Warren's elaborate soirees by Boston newspapers in the
highly personal "yellow journalism" of the day, culminating in Mrs. War-
ren's irritation over the coverage of her daughter's wedding.5 Kalven,
leading modern critic of the right of privacy, adds:
There is, from my special point of view, poetic justice in the circum-
stance that so petty a tort should have been spawned by so petty a
grievance. 6
Whether petty in concept or magnificent in scope, this article has engen-
dered a flood of law review articles unparalleled in tort history.7 Actual
decisions in the area, however, number only something over 300 cases. s
'N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51.
-COOLEY, TORTS 29 (1st ed. 1879): "The right to one's person may be said to be a
right of complete immunity: to be let alone."
'Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902).
'Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
,Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALP. L. REV. 383 (1960).
'Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 329, n. 22 (1966).
7,,... no other tort has received such an outpouring of comment in the advocacy of its
existence." PROSSER, TORTS 1051 (1st ed. 1941).
'Kalven, supra note 6, at 327. See Annot., 138 A.L.R. 22 (1942); 168 A.L.R. 446
(1947); 14 A.L.R.2d 750 (1950).
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The new right was presented to a court of last resort for the first
time in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.' The New York court, in
a 4-3 decision, held that the right of privacy did not exist at common
law. 10 Relief was refused, since no injury to a property interest as the
nominal basis for damages had been shown.1 The majority gave Warren
and Brandeis passing notice, but denied the existence of the right 2 In
the course of its discussion, however, the majority suggested that legis-
lation in this area would be valid.13 The New York Legislature responded
by enacting the statutes under which the instant case was brought. 4
It was not until 1905 that the right was recognized by a court of last
resort. Then, in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., involving the un-
authorized use of the plaintiff's picture in an advertisement for insur-
ance, it was held that the right of privacy is derived from natural law,
and is embraced within the absolute rights of personal security and per-
sonal liberty.1 5
Roberson and Pavesich were followed for the next thirty years, as
courts chose to deny or acknowledge the existence of the right of privacy.
The Restatement of Torts supported it in a section added in 1939.16 From
that time, it has gained increasing recognition until, at present, thirty
states and the District of Columbia have recognized the right at coinnion
law, and four states have done so by statute. 7 Yet, as late as 1956 the
'Supra note 3, at 443.
101bid.
"Id. at 445: "'. . . each decision [relied on by Warren and Brandeis] rested either
upon the ground of breach of trust, or that plaintiff had a property right in the
subject of litigation which the court could protect." See Prince Albert v. Strange,
2 De G. & Sm. 652, 41 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1 Mae. & G. 25, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849)
(property right and ])reach of trust) ; Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345
(1888) (breach of implied contract) ; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans 402, 36 Eng. Rep.
670 (1818) (property right); Mayall v. Higbey, 1 Hurl & C. 148, 158 Eng. Rep. 837
(1862) (pr6perty right) ; Duke of Queensbury v. Shebbeare, 2 Eden 329, 28 Eng. Rep.
924 (1758) (property right).
12-Id. at 443:
If such a principle be incorporated into the body of the law through the
instrumentality of a court of equity, the attempts to logically apply the
principle will necessarily result not only in a vast amount of litigation, but
in litigation bordering upon the absurd, for the right of privacy, once
established as a legal doctrine, cannot be confined to the restraint of the
publication of a likeness, but must necessarily embrace as well the publica-
tion of a word picture, a comment upon one's looks, conduct, domestic
relations or habits. And, were the right of privacy once legally asserted,
it would necessarily be held to include the same things if spoken instead of
printed, for one, as well as the other, invades the right to be absoluetly let
alone.
"Id. at 443.
"N.Y. Sess. Laws 1903, dh. 132, §§ 1-2. Held constitutional in Rhodes v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908), aff'd. 220 U.S. 502 (1911).
Compare: Act of Feb. 20, 1905, eh. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 725: "That no portrait of a
living individual may be registered as a trade-mark, except by the consent of such
individual, evidenced by an instrument in writing. .... "
"Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905). The learned
justice relates the Fourteenth Amendment to the ancient commentators, Blackstone,
and the common-law scolds and eavesdroppers.
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS §867 (1939).
"Instant case at 539, n.7. See, in Montana, Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241
P.2d 816, 819, quoting the dissent (but not identifying it as such) of the Roberson
case, supra note 3, and the Warren and Brandeis article, supra note 4.
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state of the law was likened to a "haystack in a hurricane.' 8  Even
though it had been settled in a preponderance of jurisdictions that the
right exists, no settled unifying principle or set of principles had
emerged from sixty-five years of litigation.19 The interest which lies at
the root of the right has not been settled 20 other than to find a datum
somewhere in the Constitution. For example, it was held in Griswold v.
Connecticut21 that the right of privacy was invaded by a Connecticut
statute proscribing the use of contraceptives by married couples. Jus-
tice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the court, spoke in terms of
penumbras formed by emanations from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments. 22 But three Justices placed the right under "the
totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live,"'23 and two
under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Two Jus-
tices dissented.2-5 As a result, Griswold holds that the right of privacy is
constitutionally protected, without a majority holding that it operates
through any specific provisions or set of provisions.
26
If
If Warren and Brandeis gave birth to the right of privacy, it was
Dean Prosser who gave it form. In an article simply entitled "Privacy,"
he undertook to show that decisional law had evolved not one, but a
complex of four torts.27  They were: 1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's
seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 2) public disclosure of
private facts about the plaintiff; 3) publicity which places the plaintiff
in a false light in the public eye; and 4) appropriation, for the defen-
dant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.281 The validity of
this classification has been called into question,29 and no conscious
effort seems to have been made to apply it in the instant case. 0 But it
stands as the most useful tool of analysis yet devised for dealing with the
uncertain dimensions of privacy.
'
8 Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3rd Cir. 1956).
'Id. at 485: "The state of the law is still that of a haystack in a hurricane, but
certain words and phrases stick out. We read of the right of privacy, of invasion
of property rights, of breach of contract, of equitable servitudes, of unfair competi-
tion; and there are even suggestions of unjust enrichment.''
2 Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: an Answer to Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962 (1964) ; Prosser, supra note 5; Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom:
Issues and Provosals for the 1970's, (Part I) 66 COLum. L. REv. 1003 (1966) ; (Part
II) 66 COLum. L. REV. 1205 (1966); Kalven, supra note 6.
-381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'Id. at 484.
'Id. at 494; Goldberg, J., Warren, Ch. J., Brennan, J.
"'Id. at 500; Harlan, J.; and at 502, White, J.
"Black, J., and Stewart, J.
"An excellent collection of articles on Griswold is found in 64 MICH. L. REV. 197-288
(1965).
'Supra note 5, at 389.
2-Ibid.
'See Bloustein, supra note 20.
'But see note 9 in the majority opinion.
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In terms of Prosser's analysis, the instant case would seem to be
contemplated by 3) above, the "false light" cases. Warren and Brandeis
had envisioned a single right, a single guard against affronts to person-
ality. It was to stand with defamation, not to supplant it. But the evo-
lution of the law, in Prosser's analysis, has produced the false light cate-
gory, which suggests that invasion of privacy, as a general tort, has been
moving into the area of defamation despite the wishes of its creators.
Dean Wade has it thus:
Privacy is now fully established as a legally protected right in the
United States. Of the four recognized types of invasion of the right
of privacy, the two which are most closely analogous to the right of
reputation, as protected by the law of defamation, are "public dis-
closure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff" and "pub-
licity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye."
These two differ only in that the first involves a true statement and
the other a false statement. The hurt to the plaintiff's feelings, the
damage to his sensibilities, is essentially the same in both cases. If
the true statement is actionable in privacy, the false statement
should be actionable too. A plaintiff's action for invasion of the right
of privacy should not be subject to the defense that the communica-
tion is true or false, if it is one which could be offensive to a person
of ordinary sensibilities. And if a non-defamatory false statement is
actionable because it invades the plaintiff's right of privacy, a de-
famatory statement should be actionable for the same reason.31
If privacy actions are to replace defamation actions, it is natural to first
allow them to be used alternatively or conjunctively. That step has been
taken. In Pavesich,3 2 use of the plaintiff's picture in an advertisement
was held to be both an invasion of privacy and a libel. As to the latter,
the court reasoned that since the plaintiff's friends knew he did not own
a policy of insurance in the defendant company, they would assume he
was lying, either gratuitously or for money, and therefore he would be
held in contempt. More recently, Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co.33 involved
use of a picture of the plaintiff taxi driver, although she was not
identified by name, in an article on Washington taxi drivers which de-
picted them as "ill-mannered, brazen and contemptuous of their patrons."
Damages were awarded on the alternative grounds of invasion of privacy
and defamation.
34
By allowing recovery for violation of privacy where a defamation
action will not lie, the courts may be able to avoid traditional defenses,3 5
including retraction statutes.36 If actions may be brought for invasions
"
1Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1120 (1962).
I2Supra note 15 at 81.
&78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
"'See cases collected in Wade, supra note 31. The instant case at 543-544 is distinguished
from a libel action:
This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statutory action
by a public official. Therefore, although the First Amendment principles
pronounced in New York Times guide our conclusion, we reach that conclu-
sion only by applying these principles in this discrete context.3 5Prosser, supra note 5, at 422-423, comments that he forsees the disappearance of the
defense of truth, the requirements of special damage in the absence of libel per se,
the requirement of any defamatory innuendo at all and the retraction statutes.
1REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 64-207.1.
[Vol. 28
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of privacy as an alternative to defamation, and if that weakens the de-
fenses to defamation, what is to mark the limit of acceptable conduct?
The instant case supplies part of the answer.
III
The Hill affair was newsworthy,3 7 and the passage of three years
had not lessened the right of the press to comment on itYs But the report
was fictionalized. 9 There is a well-developed doctrine that the right of
privacy is invaded if a story is fictionalized 4 0-when the plaintiff is put
in a false light, as in Prosser's analysis.41 It is at this point that the right
of privacy and libel touch most closely, the important difference being
the presence or absence of malice. The instant case stood on this border-
line, and it was natural for the Court to find conditions ripe for a mar-
riage of the two actions. To do so, it relied principally on two cases-
Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc.,42 decided by the Court of Appeals of New
York in the interval between reargument and the decision in the instant
case, and New York Times v. Sullivan.43 In the Spahn case, Warren Spahn,
a noted baseball pitcher, was seeking an injunction and damages under
the New York right of privacy law44 for the defendant's unauthorized
publication of a fictitious biography of his life. The court held that while
he is a public personality, and therefore substantially without a right of
privacy so far as his professional career is involved, his personality may
not be fictionalized and exploited by the defendants. The publication was
found to consist of "a host, a preponderant percentage of factual errors,
distortions and fanciful passages."4 5 The rule of New York Times v. Sulli-
van46 was rejected on the ground that the case before it dealt neither with
public officials nor official conduct, and distinguished the interest of the
public in that area from the public interest in reporting events in the life
of a private individual. Thus, the New York court found no violation of
the freedoms of press and speech guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments on the basis of the status (private vis-a-vis public) of the
plaintiff.
"Instant case at 541.
"See, e.g., Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App.2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1950) (pugilist, ten
years); Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (infant prodigy, seven
years).
-Instant case at 545.
"In addition to the cases listed in note 9 of the instant case, see Reed v. Real Detec-
tive Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Strickler v. National Broadcasting
Co., 167 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal.
App.2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ; Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications,
Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
"Note 27, supra, and accompanying text.
42274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 221 N.E.2d 543 (1966). Spahn, ironically, relied in part on
Hill v. Hayes, 260 N.Y.S.2d 7, 207 N.E.2d 604 (1965), from which the appeal in the
instant case was taken.
"-376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"Supra note 1.
'sSpahn, supra note 42, at 545.
"Supra note 43.
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The Court in the instant case found otherwise. In Sullivan4 7 the
Court had held in a civil libel action that factual error or content defama-
tory to official reputation, or both, are insufficient for an award of dan-
ages unless actual aialice-knowledge or reckless falsity-is alleged and
proved. The Sullivan test for civil libel was applied to a privacy action
in the instant case:
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press
preclude the application of the New York statute to redress false re-
ports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the
defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth.
The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of
political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as these
are to health government. * * * Exposure of the self to others in
varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community.
The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society
which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. 4 s
While the Court agreed that calculated falsehood should find no immun-
ity in either case, it thought negligence too elusive a standard, placing
the press in the unhappy situation of having to guess how a jury might
assess their degree of care. 49 The law is now explicit: in public comment
upon newsworthy persons, an action for invasion of privacy will lie only
if there is proof of knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. There is
no action for negligence short of reckless fictionalization. The other torts
Prosser found within the "right to be let alone" would not seem to be
affected by the decision. The court intimated no view on "intrusion. 5
The "public disclosure of private facts" tort assumes that the event re-
ported is in the private sector of the life of even a newsworthy person,
and is inapposite here.51 No tort of appropriation is involved, although
the statute under which the action was brought and its origin shown
above indicate it was founded on the idea of appropriation.5 2 Therefore,
under Prosser's analysis, it cannot be said that the Sullivan rule in civil
defamation actions5 3 has been applied to all elements of the right of
privacy; it has been applied to only one of four identified types of in-
vasion of that interest. Sullivan extended the guarantees of the First
Amendment to defamation; the instant case extends them to one segment
of privacy actions. The stage may now be set for the absorption of defa-
mation as a part of the larger law of privacy.
4 Ibid.
'Instant case at 542.
"Which prompts the inquiry whether "reckless disregard of the truth" is easier for
the jury to distinguish from gross, but not reckless, negligence.
'Instant case at 541, n.9.
'Instant case at 539, n.7.
"Supra note 14, and instant case at 538-539.
"Note, Privilege to Defame: The United States Supreme Court Has Established a New
and Important Area of Constitutional Law, 26 MONT. L. Rv. 110 (1964). Applied to
criminal libel by Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
[Vol. 28
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IV
To recapitulate:
1) The right of privacy exists as a complex of four distinct torts;
2) Privacy actions have been used with or as alternatives to defama-
tion actions; and
3) The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and the press
apply equally to defamation and "false light" privacy actions, both re-
quiring knowing or reckless falsity on the part of the defendant.
The next logical step, perhaps taken invisibly by the instant case, is
the absorption of defamation by the right of privacy. Griswold 5 4 seems
to indicate that the most likely course for the Court to take is the bal-
ancing of one constitutional right against another-freedom of speech
and press against the equally fundamental right of privacy. Balancing at
this point seems to favor the former. In the instant case, six of the nine
justices favor a strong or absolute priority of claims for freedom of the
press over the competing claims of privacy. It thus seems safe to say
that the Court is not going to move far from its present position in the
foreseeable future. This one aspect of the right of privacy may swallow
defamation in due course, but the tests of defamation seem destined in
turn to swallow this segment of the right.
55
V
There is a grim irony in this story of a man who wanted the right
"to be let alone." To assert that right, he has stood in the judicial spot-
light for eleven years, through a trial and five appeals,56 only to find
himself thrown back for further proceedings. Should he prevail, his vin-
dication of his right of privacy, which affects us all, must seem a Pyrrhic
victory. In any event, the right of privacy as heretofore conceived seems
much narrower.
WILLIAM J. CARL.
WATER LAW: RECOGNITION OF A PUBLIC WATER RIGHT.-Respondent
DePuy mandamused the Fish and Game Commission to relicense his arti-
ficial fish ponds.1 The appellant then instituted an action for a manda-
tory injunction to compel the respondent to build a fishladder on his
"1Supra note 21.
'-In a manner reminiscent of the Gingham Dog and the Calico Cat.
'155 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1956); 207 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1960); 216 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1961); 240
N.Y.S.2d 286 (1963); 15 N.Y.2d 986, 207 N.E.2d 604 (1965); and instant case.
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 26-306 (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MON-
TANA are cited R.C.M.) provides for the licensing of artificial lakes and ponds. The
ponds in question had been licensed before and although there had been some slight
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